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Abstract
This paper addresses an important but so far neglected episode in the post-
1949 history of China – the impact of the so-called 'Cultural Revolution' on the 
country's ethnic minority populations. Specifically, it attempts to deal with the 
movement as it unfolded in the province of Yunnan where, at one stage, it be-
came an attempt by a political leadership in the provincial capital, dominated by 
military officers and supported by members of the central authorities in Beijing, 
to alter the landscape of the ethnic minority populations along the frontier. 
Using information culled from local histories and contemporary sources, the pa-
per traces the history of what even by the standards of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-76) came to be regarded as an exceptionally flawed and counterproductive 
policy. It foregrounds the human cost of its implementation and, for the first 
time, goes some way towards explaining – in more than simply general terms 
of labels like 'excesses' and 'ultra-leftism' – the trauma of those who survived 
it, a trauma that to this day still lingers in popular memory.1
Introduction
During the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution', China's southern 
frontier – where the province of Yunnan borders on Vietnam, Laos and 
Burma – witnessed the implementation of something called a 'political 
frontier defence' (zhengzhi bianfang) (PFD). As part of the Cultural Revo-
lution, the PFD has left no traces in the works of historians concerned 
with national-level events and developments, nor has it figured in social 
science scholarship concerned with the organization of political power 
and its consequences in the 'Maoist system' (Barnouin and Yu 1993; 
MacFarquhar and Fairbank 1991; Yan and Gao 1996). The probable 
explanation for this is not that the PFD was intrinsically insignificant, 
because it most certainly was not. It is however likely that the PFD has 
been overlooked because it affected what for centuries has been viewed 
by Chinese and foreigners alike as a somewhat remote corner of the 
Middle Kingdom. Physical distance still matters in the scheme of things, 
and Yunnan (literally 'south of the clouds') undoubtedly qualifies as 
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well beyond the periphery, if one's geographical or intellectual vantage 
point is – as is most often the case – China's national capital. 
The present paper attempts to tell the history of the remarkable 
mix of destructive policies and practices through which the Cultural 
Revolution came to impact on the ethnic minority populations along 
the provincial border. Pulling together data culled from contemporary 
sources and from local gazetteers (county histories) published since 
the end of the 1980s, it seeks to show how and why the PFD became a 
systematic and near-total negation of an entire spectrum of approaches 
toward the administration of the ethnic minority population on the 
frontier practised by Yunnan's provincial government prior to the 
start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. This paper will argue that in 
responding to increasingly vocal calls from the central government for 
(in the words of Mao Zedong) 'destruction, without which there can 
be no construction', local authorities with the help of the PFD brought 
to a close more than a decade and a half of co-optation and occasional 
positive discrimination.2
The PFD directly affected the lives of roughly 3 million people. To 
the non-Han majority of these residents of Yunnan's frontier counties, 
it must have appeared even harsher than the policies and practices 
already shaping the lives of ordinary Chinese further inland, simply 
because it telescoped into one massive onslaught what in the provincial 
capital, the rest of Yunnan and indeed most of China had amounted to 
a succession of political movements punctuated by periods of relative 
calm. The PFD was tantamount to land reform, thought reform, the 
formation of People's Communes, 'Four Cleanups', 'anti-revisionism', 
etc. all rolled into one. It represented a 'big bang' approach to social 
transformation. It sought to mould, as quickly as possible and by brute 
force if necessary, every member of the 'people' (the total population 
minus the class enemy) along the frontier into a corporalization of the 
communist party's 'lofty humans' (gaoji de ren) – the ideal beings that 
'we Chinese', in the words of Defence Minister Lin Biao, must become 
'if we want to stand at the forefront of the world, not resign ourselves to 
a backward position …[and] raise the position of our nation' (Lin 1967: 
135). The PFD was particularly harsh because in every respect, beginning 
with culture and ending with economics, Yunnan's frontier population 
was even further removed from the ideal than the proto-typical inlander. 
The logic of 'struggle' espoused by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
dictated that such people, who had further to go, needed to struggle or 
'be struggled' harder.
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Ethnicity, in this context, was incidental while class and class alone 
was fundamental. This was a point that had been driven home to PRC 
President Liu Shaoqi prior to his fall from grace at the start of the Cul-
tural Revolution, after he had been foolish enough to maintain that 
human nature and not class was fundamental. Liu had eventually been 
made to admit to a group of outraged university students that he had 
been in error (by 'putting the incidental before the fundamental') when 
he claimed that 'sons and daughters of the exploiting classes and any 
[members of those classes] … not yet executed are still human beings' 
(Lin 1967: 134). Ethnicity, certainly, if not yet humanity, was excluded 
from that which was fundamental to the PFD. Officially, the word 'minzu' 
('ethnicity' or 'nationality' in English) was taboo (MacKerras 2003: 21-
22). At mass rallies organized by the provincial authorities in Kunming 
in 1969, hand-picked activists from frontier counties were quoted as 
saying that 'People of the same class are our only kinsmen, not people 
of the same nationality' and, on an even higher level of generalization, 
that 'The US imperialists and the Soviet revisionists are the biggest tusi 
[native chieftains] and headmen in the world'! (Yunnan sheng shouci 
1969, (25): 6; (126): 4).
When the PFD was terminated and repudiated, as it was in the early 
1970s, it left behind a bitter legacy – and not just because of its wholesale 
rejection of the concept of ethnicity. It was above all the praxis of the 
PFD that had irreversibly alienated the very people it was supposed 
to have 'united behind the socialist cause'. More than 45,000 frontier 
households had experienced 'significant losses of private property' (so 
the official formulation, used in today's history books) as a result of the 
cleptocratic approach to collectivization characteristic of the PFD (Yun-
nan minzu 1994, Vol. 1: 217). Thousands of innocent people had died 
'abnormal deaths' – the formulation employed in government records, 
personnel files and police dossiers to imply but not admit responsibility 
on the part of the state (Zhao 1986: 37, 224). In villages that had been 
well below the poverty line to begin with, agricultural production had 
declined precipitously as the most capable farmers had been stigmatized 
as 'capitalist forces' and traditional ecological knowledge and techniques 
been rejected as 'backward, primitive'. More than 50,000 residents of the 
frontier had left China altogether, seeking refuge with their kinsmen 
'of the same nationality' across the border in Vietnam, Laos or Burma.3 
Public law and order were in disarray. Drug use and drug smuggling 
– officially all but wiped out in the late 1950s – escalated once more and 
reached a 20-year high in 1977 (Yunnan shengzhi gonganzhi 1996: 813). Of 
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all the different approaches towards the administration of the frontier 
ever attempted by central, provincial or local governments in Yunnan 
at one time or other after 1950, none – with the possible exception of 
the Great Leap Forward – was in the end more disastrously misguided 
or devastatingly counterproductive than the PFD.
The Cultural Revolution in Yunnan: A New Order
In Beijing, beginning in the summer of 1966, the Cultural Revolution 
proceeded in a way that supposedly highlighted the role of the 'popular 
masses', most notably rebellious 'Red Guard' youths described in Red 
Flag – the propagandist organ of the CCP Central Committee – as the 
'shock force' of the movement, 'cleaning up the muck left over by the old 
society and sweeping away the rubbish accumulated over thousands of 
years of history' (Schoenhals 1996: 44). In Yunnan, after an initial period 
during which the activities of local 'Red Guards' also shaped the progress 
of the movement, virtually all the political power that mattered came to 
be concentrated in the hands of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). In 
March 1967, on orders from the central government in Beijing, a military 
control commission subordinate to the CCP Committee of the Kunming 
Military Region (MR) became the highest organ of political authority in 
the province, assuming temporarily all the powers that at the start of the 
Cultural Revolution had been vested in the Yunnan People's Committee 
(i.e. the civilian provincial government) and provincial CCP Committee 
(Zhongguo gongchandang Yunnan 1994: 223-24).4
The creation of a provincial so-called 'Revolutionary Committee' (RC) 
on 13 August 1968 marked the end of 17 months of direct military rule 
in Yunnan.5 The period during which military rule had been intended 
as a transition from something old to something new – from a form 
of government in which Mao Zedong claimed to have lost confidence 
because of its tendency to 'easily generate feudalistic, revisionist stuff' 
to a form intended to help 'consolidate and expand the authority of 
the proletariat' – was over (Mao Zedong sixiang 1968: 283, 345). But 
the PLA remained predominant as the central government assigned 
the chairmanship of the Yunnan RC to the concurrent party secretary 
and political commissar of the Kunming MR, Lieutenant General Tan 
Furen. Of the four other members of the RC CCP 'nucleus' formed on 
23 September 1968, two were lieutenant generals and one was a major 
general. Unlike some of its nominal counterparts in other provinces, 
the Yunnan RC was a perfect example of what one Chinese historian 
has called a 'mutation' of military rule, rather than what Mao Zedong 
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was on record as hoping for most of all – 'a government assumed by 
workers and peasants rising up in revolution' (Wang 1988: 306) (Mao 
Zedong sixiang 1968: 283).
Yunnan was in a state of extreme social and political tension, as were 
many other parts of China at this time.6 In its Public Notice No. 1, the 
Yunnan RC blamed the disruption and violence rocking the province 
on the machinations of a 'tiny handful of class enemies' hell-bent on 
instigating ordinary citizens to turn against the authorities. It called for 
an immediate end to what it labelled – in an unusual departure from the 
normal rhetoric of the times – 'human rights violations (qinfan renquan) 
by mass organizations' (Relie huanhu 1968: 52). Ominously, it made no 
mention of the possibility of human rights violations committed by the 
authorities themselves. Yet when the Yunnan RC at the end of the year 
embarked on a province-wide movement to 'resolutely and thoroughly 
flush out class enemies lurking in every corner', it acted with a brutality 
that made everything the 'masses' or even the 'class enemy' had managed 
to accomplish up to that point pale by comparison (Kunming nonglin 
1969: 248-51).7 According to an official estimate, no less than 17,000 
persons were killed and 61,000 permanently injured as a direct result 
of the hard line implemented by the Yunnan RC over the years that 
followed (Dangdai Zhongguo de Yunnan 1991, Vol. 1: 175). An unofficial 
estimate by a Chinese historian gives an even more staggering figure, 
suggesting that 'according to statistics from 1975', the total number of 
dead exceeded 37,000, while those who suffered imprisonment, torture 
and injury totalled 300,000 (Yang 1993: 55).8
Political Frontier Defence: The Initial Model
Accounts published in Yunnan in the 1990s hold Lin Biao personally 
responsible for coming up with the name 'political frontier defence' 
and – by implication – for sanctioning the particular bundle of policies 
and practices that it came to designate (Yunnan minzu 1994, Vol. 1: 215). 
Cultural revolutionary media, too, mention Lin's name in conjunction 
with the PFD. A propaganda piece from the Guangzhou MR on the 
heroic exploits of a certain company based on the Hong Kong border 
relates how it 'successfully implemented in practice Vice-Chairman Lin's 
important instructions concerning the construction of a political frontier 
defence' (Jiefangjun bao, 13 September 1968). And a New China News 
Agency press release about a company in Yunnan refers to it as having 
'faithfully implemented Vice-Chairman Lin's instructions on managing 
the political frontier defence well' (Jiefangjun bao, 8 April 1967).
32  The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 19•2004
Michael Schoenhals
Unfortunately, nothing more is known about the precise nature of 
Lin's 'instructions'. Some of the evidence cited in support of the theory 
that it was Lin who had come up with the PFD name in August 1966 
is spurious.9 But there was almost certainly a link between Lin and the 
PFD, although its exact form remains unknown. From the absence of 
even a single reference to it in editions of Lin's selected works published 
in his lifetime and still available in the public domain, one is forced to 
conclude that the PDF was not central to his political rhetoric. (Equally 
important, perhaps, is the coincidental absence of any known record 
linking Mao Zedong or Premier Zhou Enlai personally to the term.)
Whatever the precise background, it is clear that the PFD was closely 
associated from the outset with the Kunming MR. It was presented in 
the Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun bao) as the Kunming MR Party 
Committee's contribution to the national plethora of positive models 
for study and emulation that the media excelled in propagating and 
it referred specifically to the 'meritorious achievements' of the Third 
Company of the Kunming MR Fourth Frontier Defence Regiment (a.k.a. 
the 'Political Frontier Defence Model Company') stationed on the Yun-
nan–Burma border. When the communist party's Central Military Com-
mission (CMC) in 1967 – for the second time in three years – conferred 
an honorific title upon the company, its meritorious achievements were 
said, in short, to consist of the application of Mao Zedong's teachings 
to the tasks of 'fighting the enemy, defending the frontier and doing 
work in relation to national minority affairs and building up the bor-
der regions' (SCMP 1967, Vol. 3916: 33). The primary achievement that 
gave rise to the name 'Political Frontier Defence Company' was the 
one involving the local ethnic minority population. In a rare English-
language dispatch from Kunming entitled 'Red Bastion on Southwest 
China Frontier', the New China News Agency in April 1967 hinted at 
what this may have entailed:
[Between 1956 and 1967] the army men called on all the poor families in the 
area bringing with them Chairman Mao's works. They did innumerable 
services, big and small, for the people and established a revolutionary 
friendship with them … [The] cadres and fighters of the company took 
Chairman Mao's article 'Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society' as the key 
in their work of teaching the people of the various national minorities in the 
area. Artificial divisions between the nationalities, a legacy from history, were 
used by the local feudal officials to sow dissension between the army men 
and the Dai, Jingpo and Lisu people when the Third Company first arrived 
[in 1956]. Faced with this situation, the army men re-studied Chairman Mao's 
teaching: 'In the final analysis, national struggle (minzu douzheng) is a matter 
of class struggle'. (SCMP 1967, Vol. 3917: 28)
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The original context of Mao's 1963 reference to national or ethnic (the 
Chinese term is the same) struggles as ultimately subordinate to class 
struggles had been the civil rights movement in the United States (Mao 
1966). In 1967, it was re-contextualized to explain what was happening 
in Dai villages in Southwest China:
The Dai peasants have chosen to remove from their homes the tablets before 
which they were accustomed to worship gods and the spirits of ancestors. 
Now they like to have on their walls a picture of the Dai people's beloved 
leader Chairman Mao. Through studying Chairman Mao's works, the Dai 
villagers have radically changed their world outlook. Some of them have even 
become advanced workers. Thousands upon thousands of the Dai, Jingpo 
and Lisu people enlightened by the penetrating thought of Mao Zedong, 
came to understand 'Who are our enemies? Who are our friends?' Blazing 
flames were kindled in their hearts. (SCMP 1967, Vol. 3917: 29)
It is important to note that what is described here in positive terms 
already represented quite a deviation from the relatively moderate 
policy that the civilian provincial government had laid down in 1964 
and which the central government had approved that same year. The 
need to distinguish 'friends' from 'enemies' and to replace one's ancestral 
tablets with pictures of the 'beloved leader Chairman Mao' was in line 
with a radicalization for which the PLA, more specifically the Kunming 
MR, and not the nationalities affairs departments of the Yunnan provin-
cial and autonomous prefectural governments, was responsible. In the 
winter of 1965-66, the MR had endorsed the practice of 'grasping one or 
two model villages and setting them up as models for emulation' and 
two years later, with the ascendancy of increasing numbers of military 
officers to positions of decision-making in the complex area of inter-eth-
nic relations, the practices associated with the 'model' Third Company 
of the Fourth Frontier Defence Regiment came to embody all that was 
'revolutionary' and hence 'entirely correct' (Yunnan shengzhi: junshizhi 
1997: 547). Provincial First Party Secretary Yan Hongyan's warnings of 
the dangers involved in calling for attacks on 'old habits, old corrupt 
customs, monks and Daoist priests' in the ethnic minority areas along 
the frontier had only limited impact (and ultimately contributed to his 
own downfall in the winter of 1966) (Yunnan minzu 1994, Vol. 2: 159). 
Instead, in a polemical article on the PFD entitled 'Where is Yunnan 
Headed III: Do We Want a Production Frontier or a Political Frontier?' 
a Kunming paper in the spring of 1967 latched on to the word 'political' 
but discarded the reference to 'defence' in order to maintain that turn-
ing all of Yunnan into a 'political frontier' had become the 'glorious and 
arduous task handed to us by Chairman Mao' (Gongchandang xuanyan, 
14 April 1967).
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The Anti-Revisionist Frontiers in 1968: Model becomes Policy
In the autumn and winter of 1968, after being put in charge of the 
Yunnan RC, Tan Furen and his fellow officers quickly prioritized the 
substitution of the PFD for the policies and practices sanctioned by the 
'revisionist' regime they had succeeded. The greatest danger at present, 
Tan stressed, was that of 'rightism' and not 'leftism' (Tan 1974: Section 
7: 87 ). In plain speech, in conversations with local leaders during his 
travels across the province, he elaborated on what this meant and called 
for an end, once and for all, to the unwarranted 'civility' that supposedly 
had characterized his predecessors' attitude toward 'class enemies' on 
the frontier:
It should be a political frontier defence, but what you have here is a civil 
frontier defence [limao bianfang], a revisionist frontier defence and a peaceful 
transition [heping guodu] frontier defence. What sort of peaceful transition 
is that if not one to capitalism? It's the kind of stuff that Liu [Shaoqi] and 
Yan [Hongyan] practised, with no mobilization of the masses, and no class 
struggle. [You say you are] afraid of people running away [across the border]: 
I say, let the bad guys run away and leave it at that! In the frontier areas, 
how can you possibly concentrate only on raising the cultural level and 
on production without linking them to the political struggle, to the class 
struggle? (Ding and Ting 1999: 198-99)
Zhou Xing, the first vice-chairman of the Yunnan RC and former pro-
vincial governor, who had spent most of his life in the public security 
sector, argued that the time had come to dispense with the preferential 
treatment so far accorded Yunnan's ethnic minority leaders, tusi and 
'reactionary headmen':
Whether or not Yunnan can be consolidated and developed depends on how 
the struggle against the enemy is handled. For one, Yunnan was the last part 
of the southwest to be liberated. The counter-revolutionaries, dregs of the old 
society, Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary court and the reactionary 
powers of Long Yun and Lu Han all came running here. Furthermore, it was 
liberated peacefully. Here neither the democratic revolution nor the socialist 
reform movement was very thorough. Each time an attempt was made, 
there was this awful fear that it might cause resentment among the tusi or 
headmen. In actuality, the guiding ideology was that of Liu Shaoqi and Deng 
Xiaoping, of rightist opportunism, of counter-revolutionary revisionism. It 
was class reconciliation, motivated by a fear of shaking up the reactionary 
headmen. (Ding and Ting 1999: 200)
Tan Furen concurred with Zhou and informed lower-level officials 
that, contrary to what they had been told in the past, the frontier re-
gions were in no way 'special'. There was no reason why they should be 
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exempted from the policies and practices that had already been put in 
effect further inland, in some cases as far back as in the 1950s. A 'class 
struggle' was now to be launched: 
To solve problems in the rural villages, you launch a class struggle. The same 
applies to the frontier: it is not special in any way. If you don't launch a class 
struggle, what are the alternatives? First of all, round up all the bad people 
you've cleansed out, the landlord elements and the rich peasant elements, 
and concentrate them in a Study Class. Mobilize the masses and have them 
do it. If land is to be divided up and redistributed, then so be it. If movable 
[landlord and rich peasant] property is to be divided up and redistributed, 
then so be it. What is there to be afraid of? Try it in one place first: once you 
have a precedent, others will follow. All you have to do is get the masses 
mobilized, then whatever land or grain has to be divided up and redistributed 
will be divided up and redistributed. Without a class struggle there can be 
no political frontier defence. (Ding and Ting 1999: 199)10
In the course of being propagated, amplified and exemplified in this 
way, the scope and intensity of that part of the PFD described as 'doing 
work in relation to minority affairs' increased significantly. In Febru-
ary 1969, Tan led a delegation from the Kunming MR to Beijing to seek 
formal approval at the highest level.
Tan was not the only senior PLA officer responsible for a frontier 
region populated by ethnic minorities who at this point appears to have 
equated increasingly radical measures with efficient measures. Also vis-
iting Beijing in February 1969 was Lieutenant General Teng Haiqing, 
Tan's counterpart in Inner Mongolia, and to his subordinates Teng also 
emphasized that 'the main danger at present' was one of 'rightism' and 
not 'leftism'. This he did at a time when in Inner Mongolia, more than 
250,000 'class enemies' had already been 'uprooted' – the political meta-
phor that meant on the steppes of Inner Mongolia what 'weeded out' 
meant in the forests of Yunnan. Only an 'extremely small minority' of 
these, however, so Teng admitted two months later, were in actuality 
'bad people' (Teng et al. 1969).
For all we know, no lessons were drawn from what was happen-
ing in Inner Mongolia, where according to Teng, inter-ethnic relations 
had 'become quite tense' (Teng et al. 1969). On 26 February 1969, the 
Kunming MR delegation was given a positive hearing by the CMC 
Office Group – the body under General Huang Yongsheng that had 
temporarily assumed the functions of the CMC Standing Committee in 
the wake of the purge of the PLA Acting Chief of Staff, General Yang 
Chengwu, in 1968. Presumably in part because it was busy monitor-
ing the increasingly tense situation on China's border with the Soviet 
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Union – where a violent border clash would erupt on 2 March – and 
with preparations for the Ninth Party Congress which was to convene 
on 1 April, the central leadership proposed few if any changes to the 
PFD as described to them by the Kunming MR. The only criticism they 
voiced concerned the past: 
In the past, the Kunming MR carried out a revisionist line in frontier defence 
work … The reactionary feudal tusi and headmen were not attacked, the 
class demarcation lines were blurred, enemies were not distinguished from 
friends, and for a long time everything remained in a state of peaceful 
coexistence. (Yunnan minzu 1994, Vol. 2: 165) 
On 21 March, the CMC Office Group circulated the 'Report from 
the Kunming MR on Intensifying the Frontier Defence Struggle in the 
Kunming Region' and called for 'intensified PFD construction' (Zhong-
guo gongchandang Yunnan 1994: 230).
'Five Measures'
At an ad hoc conference that met from 17 March to 3 April 1969, the 
Kunming MR CCP Committee and the Yunnan RC decided on the five 
'measures' that from now on, with Beijing's approval, would become 
the key ingredients of the PFD.
The first measure consisted of increasingly uncompromising demands 
upon the frontier population to manifest, at all times, 'boundless loy-
alty to Chairman Mao, boundless loyalty to Mao Zedong Thought and 
boundless loyalty to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line'. An authorita-
tive programmatic document outlining precisely what this was meant 
to entail had already been disseminated nationwide by the CCP Center 
in November 1967. Central Document Zhongfa [1967] 350 had described 
and propagated a number of quasi-religious rituals performed regularly 
by the officers and men that made up the CCP Politburo's bodyguard, 
including turning to Mao's portrait in the mornings to ask for 'guid-
ance' and to 'report back' to Mao's portrait in the evenings (Yunnan 
sheng 1969, Vol. 1: 645-71). At Yunnan's first ever Provincial Congress 
of Activists in the Living Study and Living Application of Mao Zedong 
Thought in 1969, one Lisu activist from Eduoluo Production Brigade 
not far from the Burmese border in Bijiang county described how his 
kinsmen struggled with this notion of 'loyalty' to Chairman Mao in 
their daily lives. He quoted a mother of five and the wife of a barefoot 
doctor as saying:
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In the past, we were the oxen and the horses of the tusi and the headmen. We 
suffered in misery, most of all because we were powerless. Now Chairman 
Mao has put the big seal in the hands of us poor and lower-middle peasants, 
but I still have many selfish thoughts and worry about the number of work 
points our family is earning. Whenever the old hen has laid a few extra 
eggs, I forget all about the importance of the big seal. It's all because I've 
been poisoned by Liu Shaoqi's 'three freedoms and one guarantee' and 'four 
big freedoms.' I am not being loyal to Chairman Mao. (Yunnan sheng shouci 
1969, (25): 5)
The CCP Center did on occasion show signs of a certain ambivalence 
towards manifestations of 'loyalty' that had a detrimental impact on 
'other forms of work'. For example, in June 1969 it noted in Central 
Document Zhongfa [1969] 33 that 'since old newspapers are by neces-
sity used [for other purposes, e.g. as toilet paper – transl.] and recycled 
… they should under normal circumstances not have Chairman Mao's 
portrait on the masthead' (Yunnan sheng 1969, Vol. 2: 1368). But for a 
Lisu woman to self-criticize for paying rather more attention to a hen 
and its eggs than to Mao Zedong thought was quite appropriate.
Measure number two introduced the local content of the nation-
wide movement to 'cleanse the class ranks'. This movement did not 
proceeded along identical paths and timelines in all parts of China: so 
for instance in the national capital, it lasted from January 1968 to May 
1969 and, according to official statistics, claimed the lives of 3,731 per-
sons (of these, a staggering 3,512, or 94 percent, were suicides) (Beijing 
dangshi 1987, Vol. 18: 30). Nationwide, according to one CCP historian, 
the 'cleansing of the class ranks' resulted in the 'mistaken' persecution 
of millions (Wang 1988: 299). In Yunnan, it was in the frontier regions 
actually less an attempt at cleansing any existing 'class ranks' than an 
attempt at conclusively identifying, for the first time, such ranks. The 
PFD thus became the vehicle for attempts to assign 'class' categories to 
a 'residual' segment of the frontier population. That segment comprised 
some 900,000 or so members of ethnic minorities who in the 1950s had 
never been formally 'class-ified', but permitted to make what was crypti-
cally referred to as a 'direct transition to socialism'. Also affected were 
some 1.59 million people who so far had been given only preliminary 
('for internal reference') class labels (Ding and Ting 1999: 201). 
In the introduction to a Kunming collection of texts on how to carry 
out the 'cleansing of the class ranks', Mao Zedong was quoted as say-
ing that '[The main purpose of] assigning class status is the cleansing 
out of bad elements' (Kunming nonglin 1969: 14) and in more than one 
frontier county this meant that impoverished farmers whose 'loyalty to 
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Chairman Mao' was in doubt or who were otherwise deemed 'bad', ran 
the risk of being given the class status of 'landlord', while rich farmers 
without an attitude problem just might succeed in attaining the coveted 
status of 'lower-middle peasant' (Ding and Ting 1999: 203) The name 
given this voluntaristic practice was that of 'assigning class status by 
way of a full mobilization of the masses'. It was 'endorsed in principle' 
by the CCP Center on the condition that a maximum of 8 percent of the 
total number of ethnic minority households were assigned 'exploiting 
class' status (Zhonggong zhongyang 1987–98, Vol. 13: 258).
The third measure was the creation of 'People's Communes' along the 
frontier. In China's inland provinces and elsewhere in Yunnan, People's 
Communes had constituted the normal form of political and economic 
organization in the countryside since 1958. Among the ethnic minorities 
on the Yunnan frontier they had been tried at first, but eventually dis-
solved as not viable in 1961 (Zhonggong Yunnan 2004: 1- 40). Beginning 
in late 1966, sporadic attempts had been made locally in the Dai and 
Jingpo prefecture of Dehong to replace the existing agricultural produc-
tion co-operatives with the supposedly 'higher' – in the sense of 'more 
socialist' – form of organization of the Commune. These attempts appear 
to have been frustrated by the volatility of the political situation, passive 
resistance on the part of the local population and an exceptionally high 
local leadership turnover at the time (Yunnan minzu 1994, Vol. 1: 218-19; 
Vol. 2: 155-57). The establishment of the Yunnan RC in 1968 finally paved 
the way for the eventual success of a provincial leadership like that of 
Tan Furen – who almost certainly considered the creation of People's 
Communes on the frontier as a way of accumulating political capital in 
Beijing. In neighbouring Tibet, some 150 People's Communes had been 
established on a trial basis by the end of 1966, and their numbers had 
been increasing steadily ever since.11  In a post-PFD Conference report 
to the CCP Center on 8 April 1969, Tan's leadership justified 'accelerat-
ing the process of creating People's Communes' by highlighting 'the 
situation at present and the urgent demands put forward by the masses 
along the frontier' (Yunnan minzu 1994, Vol. 1: 219).
Measure number four was formulated at the time as the mobiliza-
tion of the masses to politically 'topple and discredit' their tusi and 
headmen. Economically, the former upper strata of the ethnic minori-
ties were to be deprived of their subsidies, in conformity with the way 
capitalists and other wealthy 'class enemies' were treated in places like 
Shanghai, Beijing and Kunming. The tusi and headmen that had taken 
up residence in Kunming and in prefectural and county government 
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seats were to have their urban residence permits withdrawn and they 
were then to be sent back to their ancestral villages to be 'struggled by 
the masses'. This practice of repatriation of undesirables from urban to 
rural areas was common elsewhere in China and had been endorsed by 
the central authorities on a number of occasions (Yunnan sheng 1969, 
Vol.1: 296-302). Interestingly enough, Mao Zedong had made vaguely 
sceptical comments about it in 1966, arguing that it amounted to 'pass-
ing a contradiction on to the lower levels to solve, rather than,' as was 
proper', digesting it oneself' (Zhongyang shouzhang 1967, Vol. 1: 249).
The fifth and final measure was just about the only one that bore a 
direct relationship to the 'frontier' aspect of the PFD and it called for the 
identification and unspecified 'thorough weeding out' of the so-called 
'nine kinds of persons' among those who had 'returned from abroad … 
and their relatives'. The 'returnees' as a distinct category would hardly 
have existed had it not been for the CCP's attempt, ten years earlier, 
to enter 'communism'. Between September and November 1958, the 
so-called 'Great Leap Forward' had made refugees of approximately 
110,000 frontier residents who, rather than join in the CCP's saltationist 
folly, had chosen exile in Vietnam, Laos or Burma. Most of these refu-
gees had returned in 1959 and in the early 1960s and had succeeded 
in picking up where they had left off, but in the eyes of the authorities 
they had remained politically suspect ever since (Yunnan minzu 1994, 
Vol. 1: 190-93).
Given how common references to 'nine kinds of persons' are in the 
literature that touches upon the PFD in China today, one would have 
assumed that there is agreement on what the 'nine kinds' actually 
were. This, however, is not the case. Authors agree that the CCP's five 
'classic' 'elements' from the 1950s (i.e. 'landlord, rich peasant, counter-
revolutionary, bad and Rightist elements') and 'renegade' and 'special 
agent' were among the nine, but that is all one can say with certainty. 
An official history of the CCP in Yunnan gives the final two of the nine 
elements as 'arch-unrepentant capitalist roaders' and 'active counter-
revolutionaries' respectively, while the authoritative Forty Years of 
Nationality Work in Yunnan gives them as 'arch-unrepentant capitalist 
roaders' and 'bourgeois reactionary academic authorities' and this lat-
ter choice is echoed in a biography of provincial Party Secretary Zhao 
Jianmin in which 'bourgeois intellectuals' as a term is used as a polite 
alternative to 'bourgeois reactionary academic authorities' (Zhongguo 
gongchandang Yunnan 1994: 231; Yunnan minzu 1994, Vol. 1: 217; Ding 
and Ting 1999: 202). The real original nine categories, however, were 
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in fact those mentioned in a resolution passed by Tan Furen's RC at 
its first plenary session on 19 August 1968. In the resolution, the nine 
major 'class enemy' categories in Yunnan are listed as 'special agents, 
renegades, arch-unrepentant capitalist roaders, KMT dregs of the old 
society and unreformed landlord, rich peasant, counter-revolutionary, 
bad and Rightist elements' (Relie huanhu 1968: 44). The reason for the 
apparent confusion more than 30 years later is, of course, that censorship 
regulations now forbid the use of language such as 'KMT dregs' which is 
seen as incompatible with united front tactics aimed at improving rela-
tions with the KMT and ultimately the 'reunification of the motherland'. 
Every author has had to find his or her way around the problem of how 
to mention the unmentionable.
Of these five 'measures' as finalized in April 1969, the first was by its 
very nature not something that could be 'concluded' at any one point 
in time, and during the months and years that followed, the deifica-
tion of Mao waxed and waned with the seasons – high points usually 
occurring on such auspicious dates as the 1 July and 26 December, the 
birthdays of the CCP and Mao Zedong respectively. The third meas-
ure, the reorganization of the political and economic structure of rural 
villages and townships, was, on the other hand, a one-off affair. With 
Baoshan prefecture taking the lead, the 26 counties located on or close 
to the frontier witnessed the transformation of co-ops and townships 
into People's Communes in a space of less than three months (Dangdai 
Zhongguo de Yunnan 1991, Vol. 1: 180). Beginning in the summer of 
1969, the measures that really sustained the PFD were the 'class-ifica-
tion' of the frontier population and the accompanying degradation and 
sometime physical elimination of persons 'identified' as enemies of one 
kind or another. 
Phase One: On the Border with Vietnam and Laos
Local histories published in the 1990s indicate that the PFD came first 
to the counties located in Diannan, i.e. the southern provincial Military 
Sub-districts (MSD) of Wenshan, Mengzi and Simao. Here, on the border 
with Vietnam and Laos, supreme military and political power lay in 
the hands of PLA units with historical links to Liu Bocheng's and Deng 
Xiaoping's Second Field Army which had arrived in Yunnan in 1950. 
Wenshan MSD responded quickly to the calls emanating from the 
PFD Conference in March–April 1969 by organizing ad hoc county-level 
'Political Frontier Defence Construction Leading Groups'. In Maguan 
county, right on the Sino-Vietnamese border, one such group organized 
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298 military and civilian cadres from the county seat into work teams and 
dispatched them to eight People's Communes bordering on Vietnam. 
Nothing is known about the precise nature of the activities of the work 
teams here, other than that they withdrew amidst celebrations of victory 
on the eve of Mao Zedong's 77th birthday, in December 1970 (Maguan 
1996: 32). However, in Mengzi MSD the activities of similar PFD work 
teams are fairly well documented. Here violent confrontation between 
the military and ethnic minority populations ensued within days of 
the arrival of the first teams. During a visit to Hekou Yao autonomous 
county, bordering on Maguan, Tan Furen had tried in person to 'foment 
a class struggle' by challenging the loyalty and political direction of the 
local population:
Do you have any tusi or headmen here? (People answer: No tusi. There is 
a retired Mulao headman who lives in the prefectural seat. Nobody in the 
county seat, though.) In the Cultural Revolution, did you give these people 
the hard time they deserve? (People answer: Just positive education, not 
what they deserve.) If you don't give these people the hard time they deserve, 
even in a Cultural Revolution, then who are you really rebelling against? 
(Ding and Ting 1999: 200)
Tan's final provocative question backfired, however, when it was ac-
companied by a ban on the use of the Yao language at meetings and a 
decree ordering all Yao women to cut their hair and wear 'Han' clothes. 
When the authorities in the prefectural seat called for the confiscation of 
all hunting rifles by a certain date, this was widely resisted not only by 
ordinary villagers – who regarded it as illegitimate interference in their 
livelihood – but by grass-roots level Yao cadres as well. On 15 April, 
in Yaoshan People's Commune, more than 3,000 members of the local 
population fled into the mountains after a bloody confrontation with 
a PFD work team out to confiscate rifles. When the PLA was called in 
to 'resolve' this so-called 'counter-revolutionary riot', as it immediately 
became known, it did so mainly by using its own superior firepower 
(Yunnan minzu 1994, Vol. 1: 425). In the words of a local history pub-
lished in the 1980s, 'a number of cadres and masses were erroneously 
disposed of, and innocent people lost their lives' (Yunnan sheng Honghe 
1989: 302).
In Pingbian Miao autonomous county, just to the north of Hekou and 
not even actually on the border, the PFD turned equally violent. Years 
later (in 1978) the county party committee issued an official 'reversal of 
verdicts' in which some of the worst 'excesses' were listed (Pingbian 1990: 
187-89). Unfortunately for the historian, the identities of the perpetra-
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tors of those excesses are not identified and precisely what is meant by 
references to the 'factional followers of Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four" 
in Yunnan' is unclear. Given the absence of names, one can only assume 
that the 'they' in the excerpt below refers to PFD work teams made up, 
at least in part, of PLA officers and men:
Pingbian was [in 1969] designated an 'Artillery Control Area' (paoguanqu) 
and the Revolutionary Committees throughout the country were all labelled 
'hornet nests'. Putting forth the reactionary slogan 'stab open the hornet 
nest and catch the hornet king alive', they set out to obtain confessions 
by compulsion, fascist style, and gave them widespread credence. They 
delivered merciless blows at cadres at all levels and subjected them to brutal 
persecution. Countless ethnic minority cadres and masses were labelled 
'counter-revolutionaries', 'special agent circles', and 'anti-army mutiny-
provoking elements'. In the span of only a few months … some 523 persons 
were labelled 'special agents' or 'counter-revolutionaries'; altogether 39 
were hounded to death (of these, 12 Miao, 4 Zhuang and 7 Yi); and more 
than 1,730 were hoisted up and beaten, denounced and struggled, forced to 
wear black signboards around their necks and paraded through the streets. 
(Pingbian 1990: 187)
In Luchun county, populated mainly by the Hani, Yi and Yao, the 
PFD was formally launched on 1 May 1969. In the space of 16 months, 
the PFD as implemented by three consecutive waves of work teams re-
sulted in the identification and 'weeding out' of close to 500 'nine kinds 
of persons' including 22 previously unidentified landlord elements, 15 
new historical counter-revolutionaries and 3 'secret agent suspects'. 
The number of 'denunciation and struggle' meetings held totalled 783 
(Luchun 1992: 40; 468–69).
Simao MSD invented an unusual kind of inter-county 'responsibility 
system' to execute the tasks that were deemed central to the PFD (Simao 
1996, Vol. 1: 43). In Menghai county, located right on the Sino-Burmese 
border and populated mainly by the Dai, Hani and Lahu, the Revolution-
ary Committee of Simao prefecture employed such a system by assigning 
to the Hani autonomous county of Mojiang, located many miles further 
inland, the task of organizing and sending a 900 person-strong 'Poor 
and Lower Middle Peasants Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team' 
to Menghai. Either because it was faced with a shortage of genuine 'poor 
and lower middle peasants' or because it knew conditions in Menghai to 
be extremely primitive, Mojiang chose to enlist even barbers and cooks 
on the team. One important difference between the Hani in Mojiang 
and the Hani in Menghai in this context was that on the Marxist scale 
of development (as enunciated by the CCP), the Hani in Mojiang were 
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more 'progressive' by virtue of practising a 'landlord economy' than their 
brethren in Menghai who still adhered to a 'feudal suzerain economy' 
(Dangdai Zhongguo de Yunnan 1991, Vol. 2: 219-20). The Mojiang team 
joined some 3,100 local PLA officers and state farm cadres in what at the 
time was called simply 'going to the frontier to catch enemies' (Yunnan 
minzu 1994, Vol. 1: 218). In 1969, throughout Menghai county, according 
to an official chronology published in 1997, persons classified as 'prob-
lematic landlord elements, rich peasant elements, reactionary elements, 
bad elements or Rightist elements' were rounded up in concentration 
camps and forced to labour under the supervision of armed militia. The 
number of 'unjust, false and mistaken cases' that this occasioned in the 
end totalled more than 2,000 (Menghai 1997: 17).
In Jiangcheng Hani autonomous county, on the border with Laos 
and Vietnam, a similar 'responsibility system' was employed, this time 
involving the inland Hani and Lahu autonomous county of Zhenyuan. 
Zhenyuan, too, was more 'progressive' (in Marxist terms) than its sis-
ter county on the frontier, as far as the economic development of the 
resident Hani population was concerned (Dangdai Zhongguo de Yun-
nan 1991, Vol. 2: 219-20). From Zhenyuan, more than 700 persons were 
dispatched to Jiangcheng to augment what was seen as an insufficient 
number of persons that could actually be 'relied upon'. The following 
details of the PFD in Kangping People's Commune, Jiangcheng, were 
published in an official history in the late 1980s:
The 'Political Frontier Team' employed torture to extract a confession from 
a Baka Production Team member who, after having had an illicit affair with 
someone whose spouse was a member of the PLA, had attempted to escape 
[across the border]. They kept on beating him until the blood gushed forth 
from his nose and mouth. They refused to stop until they were satisfied 
they had the 'political background' of his attempted escape. With the help 
of confessions extracted through torture and intimidation, they came up 
with the existence of a 'secret counter-revolutionary organization with illicit 
foreign links' in Baka. Of the total 26 households in the production team, 23 
were said to be involved. The savage and ferocious methods employed by 
the 'Political Frontier Team' were so bad that for a long time, the peasants 
in Baka were subject to a fascist dictatorship. During the day, they were not 
permitted to come into contact with each other, and at night no visits between 
households were allowed. There were sudden household searches, and if the 
peasants were slow in opening their doors [to the search parties] the doors 
would be smashed with stones or rifle butts, or pried open with knives …
In addition to slapping their targets in the face while forcing them down 
on their knees, the [Political Frontier Team] also dipped people's hair in 
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kerosene and then set it aflame, scorched people's buttocks with firewood 
and staged fake executions. There were altogether 32 able-bodied men in the 
production team, and of these 28 were investigated. Seven were subjected 
to cruel torture, as a result of which three were crippled and one died. 
(Jiangcheng 1989: 269-70) 
Jiangcheng also witnessed the enforced rural resettlement of 'urban' resi-
dents of allegedly 'bad' class background. Once it had been determined 
that they were unsuited to remain in the townships of Jiangcheng, such 
people were forcibly dispatched to the countryside to 'labour under the 
supervision of the masses' (Jiangcheng 1989: 269-70).
In Lancang Lahu autonomous county, a total of 2,291 households 
spread out over 13 People's Communes had their homes raided and 
possessions valued at altogether 487,836 Yuan confiscated by a work 
team comprising more than 1,000 locals and outsiders dispatched from 
Simao (Yunnan minzu 1994, Vol. 1: 217) (Lancang 1996: 457). Neighbour-
ing Ximeng Wa autonomous county (one of the smallest counties in 
all of Yunnan), contemporary sources tell us, was the home of one of 
the best-known PFD 'model units' – New Little Hamlet, a.k.a. the Red 
Flag Production Team of the Red Flag Production Brigade of the Red 
Flag People's Commune. Here, in the spring of 1970, the 'revolutionary 
masses' were ordered to learn from New Little Hamlet's 'Red Flag Peo-
ple's Militia Platoon' and its exemplary courage in repelling incursions 
across the Burmese border by 'KMT dregs of the old society' (Yunnan 
sheng shouci 1969 (126): 2-6; Yunnan sheng 1973, Section 6: 26). Today's 
accounts highlight a different facet of the PFD in Ximeng: here and in 
three neighbouring counties it claimed the lives of a total number of 
718 people 'due to abnormal causes' (Yunnan minzu 1994, Vol. 1: 217). 
In the same counties, 3,950 households had greater or lesser parts of 
their property confiscated. The 212 richest households had residential 
property totalling 8,865 square meters confiscated, estimated at 554,000 
Yuan in value, together with other valuables (rice, draught animals, 
cash, furniture, work points, etc.) estimated at 688,300 Yuan (Simao 
1996, Vol. 2: 33).
Phase Two: Western Yunnan
What could be learnt from the first year of the PFD in Diannan was a 
topic high on the agenda of a meeting convened by the Yunnan RC and 
Kunming MR in Lancang Lahu autonomous county in the final days 
of March 1970. In the wake of the meeting, the provincial civilian and 
military media called on political and military leaders at all levels to 
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make PFD 'construction' a central aspect of their day-to-day work. In 
response to an inquiry from the CMC Office Group into why some areas 
were lagging behind, the Yunnan RC and Kunming MR dispatched 52 
work teams to 39 different pilot units to 'aid' those areas in 'identifying 
discrepancies and clarifying directions' (Yunnan minzu 1994, Vol. 2: 166-
68). The result was a further intensification of the PFD that impacted on 
Dianxi (the western provincial Military Subdistricts of Baoshan, Lijiang 
and Lincang) where, judging from the available sources, the high tide 
of the PFD on the whole occurred later than in the south.
An official chronology, published in 1995, of Tengchong county 
– located in the Baoshan MSD – does not mention the PFD in any of 
its entries for 1969. In September 1970, it states, teams of cadres were 
dispatched from the county seat to rural People's Communes to engage 
in PFD 'construction', and the outcome was 'no small number of unjust, 
false and mistaken cases' (Tengchong 1995: 40). In Ruili, the PFD resulted 
in the departure – across the border into Burma – of over 4,000 frontier 
residents in the winter of 1969-70. This was in no small part almost cer-
tainly due to the fact that they had been forcibly 'liberated' from their 
property. This is how one source describes what happened:
In some counties … the raids on people's homes were carried out in one of 
two ways. One way of doing it was to gather together a bunch of people 
who waving red flags, carrying portraits of Mao Zedong and shouldering 
Mao Zedong quotation boards, would approach the family home about to 
be raided. Once in place they would order the entire family out and force 
it to kneel in front of the house. Hereupon a bunch of people would enter 
the home to pick out everything of any value and cart it off. Another way 
of doing it was simply to order the family to abandon their home or to drag 
them off elsewhere and then enter by force, smash up the place and remove 
all valuables. (Ding and Ting 1999: 204)
Suddenly faced with a depopulated border, the authorities in Baoshan 
arranged for 1,100 'poor and lower middle peasants' from counties fur-
ther inland to reclaim and settle down in the deserted frontier villages. 
Eventually, their families followed and they officially assumed the status 
of resettled farmers (Ruili 1996: 48).
An official history of Luxi county, published in 1993, makes reference 
to the use of over one hundred different forms of torture to extract con-
fessions from victims of the PFD and the 'One Hit Three Anti' campaign 
that was carried out simultaneously:
Tasks in a variety of areas were merged, and reckless denunciations and 
indiscriminate attacks occurred all over the place. A total of 3,271 persons (239 
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of them cadres, the rest just ordinary commune members) were investigated 
as part of some 304 unjust, false and mistaken cases that ultimately resulted 
in the implication of close to ten thousand people. In attempts to extract 
confessions by force, more than a hundred different forms of cruel fascist 
torture were employed, e.g. hanging a steel ring (gua gangquan), stepping on 
a pole (cai gangzi), capping with leaf lard (kou banyou), monkey moves the 
stake (houzi ban zhuang) and binding the head with iron wire (tiesi gutou). As a 
result, a total of 219 persons were persecuted to death and died of unnatural 
causes, and more than five hundred persons were crippled or injured from 
horrible torture. (Luxi 1993: 251)
A total of 1,838 fairly well-to-do households in Luxi were formally 
classified as 'rich peasants' or as otherwise belonging to the 'antagonistic' 
classes. The result of all this was a mass exodus of over 5,100 refugees, 
most of them – the county history suggests – fleeing across the border 
to Burma.
In Lushui county, Lijiang MSD, the PFD was not initiated until 1970. 
In April of that year, an official history states, three waves of work teams 
were sent to 142 mountain hamlets located on the border with Burma. 
The outcome of their activities included among other things 'numer-
ous shocking incidents of "espionage cases", "radio transmitter cases", 
"treason and join the enemy cases", and "illicit overseas contacts cases"' 
(Lushui 1995: 22). In Gengma Dai and Wa autonomous county in Lincang 
MSD, the PFD involved the 'class-ification' of persons who up to this 
point had not been 'class-ified', and the confiscation and redistribution 
according to 'class' criteria of 'excessive' private property, including resi-
dential space (Gengma 1995: 29). (By the end of 1970, policy documents 
drawn up elsewhere in the Kunming MR mentioned specifically that 
confiscated property should 'no longer be distributed to the poor  and 
lower-middle peasants', thus suggesting that the practice up until then 
must have been quite common (Dangdai Guizhou 1996: 341)).
In the final days of October 1970, a meeting to 'exchange experiences' 
from the PFD in Dianxi was convened jointly by the Yunnan RC and 
Kunming MR. The meeting ended up affirming what had been achieved 
so far and laid out plans for how the PFD could be further 'deepened' 
(Yunnan minzu 1994, Vol. 2: 169). The sudden death of Tan Furen on 17 
December 1970 (allegedly murdered by one of his own body-guards) 
did not provoke any major changes as far as the PFD was concerned 
(Ding and Ting 1999: 280). On 22 February 1971, the State Council and 
CMC called on Yunnan to 'put all frontier defence work onto the track 
of giving compulsory prominence to proletarian politics' (Zhenkang 1992: 
39). What this hyper-jargonized order meant in plain language was tacit 
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endorsement. Whereas it had indeed been possible – not to say probable 
– that the PFD was perceived initially simply as yet another political 
'movement' and as such involving the mere temporary suspension of the 
laws, norms and rules that applied at 'regular times', it had by now as-
sumed all the features of something permanent. In response to the State 
Council and CMC, 219 senior military and civilian officials in Yunnan 
involved in the PFD vowed at a special conference in April 1971 to:
put a major effort into achieving some major visible achievements and be able 
within three years or so to further reinforce the proletarian dictatorship in 
the Yunnan frontier region (the counties and [market] towns (zhen) directly 
on the border), consolidate and develop the socialist economy and build 
it into a consolidated PFD under unified party leadership with the armed 
forces as the backbone and the broad masses as the foundation. (Yunnan 
minzu 1994, Vol. 2: 171)
But then something happened in the national capital. 
More Harm than Good? – Abandoning the PFD
In July 1971, what in retrospect must be considered a crucial report was 
passed on to China's Premier Zhou Enlai by Major General Li Desheng, a 
Long March veteran and one-time Second Field Army officer appointed 
to the CMC Office Group in 1969. The report stated in euphemistic but 
clear prose that the 'class-ification' of the ethnic minority population in 
Yunnan that was such a central part of the PFD had produced 'side-ef-
fects', i.e. was doing more harm than good. Upon reading the report 
– which mentioned the Dai and the Yao specifically – Zhou wrote a 
letter to Mao Zedong, Lin Biao and the members of the CCP Politburo 
in which he dispensed with euphemisms and maintained that 'the state 
of affairs is extremely serious on the frontier and in the ethnic minority 
areas'. Given, he said, that 'we have already been made aware of the 
seriousness of the situation', the matter should be put on the Politburo 
agenda. In preparation for 'a serious discussion' by the Politburo, inves-
tigators should be sent to the area to confirm the accuracy of the report 
(Zhonggong zhongyang 1997, Vol. 3: 470).
Two Politburo meetings (neither of which was likely to have discussed 
the report) later, on 24 August 1971, Mao signed off Central Document 
Zhongfa [1971] 51 which called for a reassessment of the practice of 'class-
ifying' the ethnic minority population in key strategic areas (Zhonggong 
zhongyang 1997, Vol. 3: 470-77; Zhonggong zhongyang 1987-98, Vol. 
13: 258-59). An inquiry was to be launched – but no clear indication 
was given as to what its findings were expected to be and as a result, it 
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made little progress at first. It took the political demise of Lin Biao and 
his generals in the winter of 1971 before politicians so inclined were in 
a position to devise effective strategies for questioning and ultimately 
abandoning the PFD. Now there was someone to blame.
In February 1972, exactly three years after their first visit to Beijing to 
outline the PFD and have it endorsed by the central authorities, senior 
officials from the Kunming MR were once again in the national capital, 
this time to face the criticisms of a reorganized CMC leadership. Ac-
cording to Marshal Ye Jianying and Vice-Premier Li Xiannian, frontier 
defence work had to be 'carried out in accordance with Chairman Mao's 
teachings' and this, it was understood, had not been the case in recent 
years. Instead, 'Great Han Chauvinism' had developed and 'ethnic mi-
nority cadres and masses' had been discriminated against (Zhongguo 
gongchandang Yunnan 1994: 247). As a first step toward rectifying this 
deplorable situation, the central authorities reiterated their call for an 
inquiry – but this time with the clear mandate of substantiating an of-
ficial line on the deceased Lin Biao which had it that:
Lin Biao and his ilk talked a lot about a 'political frontier defence' but in reality 
peddled their landlord bourgeois politics, wrecked the party's nationality 
policy, wrecked economic construction on the frontier and attempted in vain 
to create chaos on the frontier. (Wang 1975, Section 7: 77)
In March and April, six teams of investigators from the Kunming MR 
CCP Committee and Yunnan RC descended on the frontier counties of 
Ruili, Ximeng, Mengla and Cangyuan and the prefectures of Honghe 
and Chuxiong. At the end of April and in the first half of May, their 
findings were presented and discussed at a series of meetings attended 
inter alia by ethnic minority cadres (Yunnan minzu 1994, Vol. 2: 173).
The meetings produced two reports. One went up the bureaucracy 
to the central party, government and military authorities and described 
the situation in ethnic minority affairs with suggestions for change and 
improvement. The other report went down the bureaucracy, to party 
committees on the county and regiment level, and it contained some 
tentative opinions on how 'ethnic minority work can be strengthened'. 
Administrative reforms were proposed and eventually undertaken, in-
cluding the re-empowerment of the ethnic autonomous prefectural gov-
ernments of Xishuangbanna, Dehong, Diqing and Nujiang, all of which 
had been rendered powerless and de facto abolished in the wake of the 
creation of the Yunnan RC. On orders from the central government, PLA 
officers began a phased withdrawal from RCs all across China: on the 
Yunnan frontier, this 'demilitarization' began with the appointment of a 
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civilian party official to the chairmanship of the Lincang RC in August 
1972 (Zhongguo gongchandang Yunnan 1994: 238, 248). In January 1973, 
a Yunnan Nationalities and Frontier Work Commission was set up to 
act as an executive organ of the provincial RC. Although led by a PLA 
officer for the first three years of its existence, its mere existence signalled 
the beginning of a new era.
On 14 August 1972, the Kunming MR Political Department decreed 
for the first time that the PFD had not merely been distorted by 'Lin Biao 
and his ilk' but had itself been an 'erroneous long-term policy' touted by 
Lin that had to be thoroughly repudiated and condemned. In its stead, 
new policies and practices were to be worked out on the basis of Mao 
Zedong's instructions from 1963 on how to prevent 'revisionism' from 
impacting on the situation in China's frontier regions (Yunnan minzu 
1994, Vol. 2: 174). The gist of those instructions had been that economic 
development was an indispensable weapon in the fight against devia-
tions from socialism (Zhonggong zhongyang 1987-98, Vol. 10: 378-79). As 
such, they pointed in a very different direction from the CCP Chairman's 
1963 comment on the US civil rights movement that had provided the 
ideological justification for the PFD.
A final high point in the repudiation of the PFD occurred during the 
1973 National Land Border Defence Conference. In the wake of that 
conference, in September 1973, the Kunming MR convened a special 
'Frontier Defence Politics [sic] Work Conference' at which the 'strategic 
significance of doing a good job of nationalities work on the frontier' 
was reaffirmed (Yunnan shengzhi junshizhi 1997: 543). Whereas speak-
ing of 'frontier defence politics' (bianfang zhengzhi) was still OK, to use 
the formulation (tifa) 'political frontier defence' in any positive sense 
was by now impossible. So tainted with negative connotations had 
it become that by the end of the 1970s the 'Political Frontier Defence 
Model Company' on the Yunnan–Burma border had to be officially 
redesignated the 'Red Bulwark Frontier Defence Company No. 3' by 
the Central Military Commission (Zhongguo gongchandang Yunnan 1994: 
550). Practically, ideologically and finally linguistically, the era of the 
PFD had come to an end.
Conclusion: Explaining what Happened
To borrow a key concept from the Yunnan RC's Public Notice No. 1, 
the PFD ended up perpetrating countless 'human rights violations'. An 
obvious challenge facing the historian is to find a mode of exposition 
that not only allows one to describe those violations but also to explain, 
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if only provisionally, why they occurred. With this aim in mind, ought 
not the history of the PFD perhaps best be told as an ethnic conflict in 
which the adversaries are the 'Han Chinese' on the one side and 'mi-
norities' on the other? Such a description would allow for a clear-cut 
story line (structured as a tragedy) and provide a compelling, 'politically 
correct' answer to the question 'Why?' by evoking the pre-existing and 
culturally near-universal archetype of David vs. Goliath. But it would 
necessitate tinkering with the evidence. Certain facts would have to 
be adjusted in order to reconstruct a past the reality of which would 
thereby be rendered inauthentic. The example of the Simao MSD shows 
that it was not the Hani per se that became targets of the PFD but the 
Hani on the frontier. The supposedly progressive Hani further inland 
were enlisted by and joined the perpetrators. At least one PFD 'model 
unit' was made up entirely of Wa militia men (who together with the 
PLA denounced the pre-1968 frontier defence of 'civility') (Yunnan sheng 
shouci 1969, (126): 3). 
A different explanation – one that elucidates more by formal argu-
ment than by emplotment – pits China's armed forces against the civil-
ian population. This explanation is supported by the facts as known, as 
well as by the CCP leadership's metonymical conceptualization of the 
relationship between the army and the state. At a plenum of the CCP 
Central Committee in October 1968, Lin Biao had declared in his typical, 
rambling style: 'Recently Chairman Mao has been emphasizing over 
and over again – and this is furthermore entirely in line with Marxism-
Leninism and the Chairman's own thinking – that what is clear is that, 
frankly speaking, essentially speaking, the so-called state is primarily 
the army' (Lin Biao 1968: 5). With the army thus already representing 
'in essence' the state, this explanation – with the help of a second me-
tonymical manoeuvre on the part of the historian involving the no less 
'essential' substitution of society for the civilian population – allows for 
congruence with the best accounts of what took place elsewhere in China 
in the 1960s. If the Cultural Revolution was the ultimate confrontation 
between the PRC state and civil society in general, then the PFD was a 
special but not a unique case, a derivation that pitted the central state 
against peripheral society, civil or not civil.
It is important in this context to bear in mind where in the state ad-
ministrative structure the PFD policy came into being. As Katherine 
Palmer Kaup pointed out in a study of the Zhuang in Yunnan and 
Guangxi, past discussions of ethnic mobilization and nationality issues 
in the PRC have tended to 'under-examine' state structures. China may 
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be a unitary state, she noted, 'but centrally determined policy is imple-
mented by authorities within territorial administrative structures' and 
even though 'there has been a great deal of attention devoted to "state 
policy" in the literature, the state and the centre have generally implic-
itly been conflated into a single monolith or otherwise been imprecisely 
differentiated' (Palmer Kaup 2002; 864-65). In the case of the PFD, the 
role of armed forces and the supra-provincial Kunming MR leadership 
backed by members of the CMC far outweighed in importance whatever 
input might have originated with remnants of the localized 'civilian' 
party and state apparatuses, all but completely destroyed in the first 
year of the Cultural Revolution.
To the extent that it was a brutal confrontation between the central 
state and peripheral society, was the PFD also a case of Chinese state 
expansion into the southwest frontier? Not in the common sense of a 
move to assert control over new or contested territory – such expansion 
had already been concluded by 1961. The frontier territory was by 1969 
a part of China. But was it a part of the 'new, socialist People's China'? 
That was in the eyes of many an altogether different question, and very 
much an open one. In the early 1960s, the term 'empty areas' referred 
in Yunnan not primarily to sparsely populated sectors of the frontier 
but to places where there was as yet no 'people's political power'. In 
view of this, the argument could be made that the PFD was indeed a 
form of state expansion. Such an argument, of course, would necessitate 
a definition of the state in cultural or ideological terms rather than in 
Realpolitik terms, a definition possibly less alien to the Chinese than 
to a 'westerner'. 
This begs the final question: whether or not the PFD can meaningfully 
be considered as a part of the great 'civilizing project' in which succes-
sive governments of China have reputedly been engaged for centuries. 
It would be hard indeed to characterize the story told in this paper as 
one of 'civilization'. In actuality, as this paper has tried to illustrate, it 
was a great barbarizing project. As such, it spoke volumes about the re-
lationship between state and society in Mao's China. And not the least 
for that reason, it deserves to be accorded far more than a peripheral 
place in the tragic history of the Cultural Revolution.
Dr Michael Schoenhals is Associate Professor (Docent) with a focus on modern Chinese 
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NOTES
1    Research for this paper was supported by a grant from the Swedish Research 
Council (VR).
2    This aspect of the Cultural Revolution was in no way limited to Yunnan but a general 
one wherein 'cultural uniqueness' ceased to be a 'valid basis for claims to particular 
treatment' (Schein 2000: 86, 144).
3    In the Cultural Revolution, similar departures en masse across the national border 
were sometimes rumoured to be in the offing, in other parts of China, but did not 
always materialize (Pang 1998: 154).
4    The Kunming MR encompassed the Yunnan and Guizhou Military Districts (sheng 
junqu).
5    The key texts documenting the creation of the Yunnan Revolutionary Committee 
are to be found in Relie huanhu (1968).
6    Compare, for example, the analysis of turmoil and violence in rural southern China 
in Unger (1998).
7    Official estimates of the total number of persons whose 'abnormal deaths' (fei 
zhengchang siwang) between April 1967 and August 1968 may be attributed to armed 
clashes between different segments of the civilian population are somewhere in 
excess of 5,000 (Zhongguo gongchandang Yunnan 1994: 231; Dangdai Zhongguo de 
Yunnan 1991, Vol. 1: 174).
8    A methodologically sophisticated estimate of national-level casualty figures is to be 
found in Walder and Su (2003).
9    E-mail from Dr Du Pu, senior researcher with the Contemporary China Research 
Institute, Beijing, 2 March 2000.
10    Yunnan's prefectural and county-level 'Study Classes' had been the subject of a 
minor nationwide emulation drive in the winter of 1967-68 (Yunnan sheng shouci 
1969 (1): 632-38).
11    By 1970, there were more than 1,200 People's Communes in Tibet (Dangdai Zhongguo 
de Xizang 1991, Vol. 1: 385-86).
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